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Abstract 
This work builds on the trivial observation that everyone 
is not trusted equally. One’s gender, ethnic group, 
occupation etc. will affect how one’s information is 
believed and interpreted by others. We begin by reviewing 
past approaches to reliability and epistemic injustice, and 
the factors which affect how one’s reliability is evaluated 
by others in discourse. We then discuss recent 
experimental results which show that the linguistic 
manipulation of gender seems  to affect the strategies 
with which the source’s reliability is evaluated. We argue 
that masculine sources benefit from more charitable 
assumptions than feminine ones. To support this claim, 
we present the results of a fine-grained categorization task. 
The results of this task seem to support our claim about 
charity, i.e. that a masculine source can more easily claim 
competence about a topic categorized as feminine, 
whereas the converse appears less true.  
1 Introduction 
Should one believe the speech of others? This is a fundamental question in 
pragmatics, and one which has been given a wide range of answers, both 
1 The authors wish to thank Zoe Luk and Regine Lai for their help in preparing and discussing the 
Cantonese materials used in this work, and Heather Burnett, Henriëtte de Swart and audiences at 
ICAL and the University of Paris 7 for helpful advice and comments. 
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within philosophy and in linguistics. However, it is a truism that not all 
people should be trusted equally; and, while it is perhaps less of a truism, 
it is clear that some people are trusted less than they should be, and some 
are trusted too much. This point is as true for groups of people as it is for 
individuals. In recent years this phenomenon has been dubbed epistemic 
injustice in the philosophical literature, where the fact that the speech of 
certain kinds of people is devalued relative to the speech of others has been 
explored extensively as an aspect of the oppression such groups face in 
human societies. 
This kind of epistemic injustice is prominent for certain ethnic groups, 
for certain kinds of minorities, and for women, who, while of course not a 
minority, have been systematically denied power of some kinds in a wide 
range of human societies. It is often claimed that the speech of women is 
also devalued, in that the claims of women are ignored relative to the 
claims of men. The main aim of this paper is to explore the truth of this 
claim from a linguistic perspective. Judging the reliability or 
trustworthiness of particular speakers depends on a range of properties of 
those speakers, as discussed extensively in section 2, where some details of 
the claims of the literature on epistemic injustice are also elaborated on; in 
practice, this means that, given specific speakers, it is difficult to isolate 
changes in epistemic authority (or lack thereof) resulting from their 
gender as opposed to other confounding factors. Further, the particular 
topic under discussion can influence the epistemic authority or reliability 
assigned to a testimonial source: although a group may be deemed 
unauthoritative in general, they still might be judged as having epistemic 
authority on a particular topic or set of topics (e.g., though politicians 
might generally be judged untrustworthy, they might be taken to be very 
authoritative with respect to safe locations for receiving bribes). 
We therefore conducted experiments aimed at isolating shifts in 
epistemic authority based on gender by means of purely linguistic factors, 
as detailed in section 3. The main technique used was to present source-
based information and ask participants to rate the convincingness of the 
information provided, where the source was varied for gender by using 
gendered pronouns or other nominals. In follow-up experiments, we 
examined the influence of topic bias: certain topics are stereotypically 
associated with women and men, and we investigated the degree to which 
such associations push judgements of authoritativeness upward or 
downward for particular genders. This set of experiments is detailed in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes and indicates some directions for future 
research. 
2 Source reliability and epistemic injustice 
This section provides background on notions of reliability, trustworthiness 
and epistemic authority in linguistics and philosophy, on how judgements 
of reliability are formed, and on how they can be skewed in the context of 
communications by groups assigned low status or actively denigrated by 
general society. We focus first on philosophical traditions of reliability 
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judgement and communication, starting with a brief discussion of the 
work of Hume (1977) and Reid (1997), and then turn to the 
implementation of McCready (2015), which gives a formal treatment of 
reliability judgements in the context of the theory of repeated games and 
probability. We will extract some relevant lessons from these theories, 
which show themselves in a different form in the cases of epistemic 
injustice we then present. 
2.1 Reliability and trust 
Without trust, communication is impossible. Since hearers would never 
believe the content of what is said, there would be no reason for speakers 
to produce it, and the whole practice would quickly die out; this can be 
viewed as one motivation for the Gricean Maxim of Quality, which dictates 
that speakers be truthful to the best of their ability (Grice, 1975). The 
question of how hearers should behave is somewhat more fraught. One 
possibility would be to have a comparable principle which we might call 
the assumption of Quality: assume your interlocutor is being truthful, and 
believe the content of what they say. But this is a dangerous move from the 
perspective of the hearer, as it’s often the case that speakers intend to 
deceive or are problematic in other ways which are less malicious but still 
make it inadvisable to trust their words: for instance, they might just be 
wrong in what they say. Considerations like these led Sperber et al. (2010) 
to propose their principle of Epistemic Vigilance, which instructs hearers 
to be careful about who they take as authoritative in their speech and 
worthy of trust. 
But how exactly is this project to be carried out? There are basically 
two possible views of the issue. The first, exemplified by Hume (1977), 
advises a kind of principle of charity, on which one ought to trust one’s 
interlocutor in the absence of reasons not to do so; the second, due to Reid 
(1997), takes distrust to be the base position and advises us to trust only if 
we can find reasons to do so (cf. van Cleve 2006). Both of these positions 
have their supporters in the current literature on the philosophy of 
testimony.2 The exact way in which they differ empirically will depend 
entirely on what we take possible reasons to trust, or not to trust, to 
consist in. 
Let us consider one exemplar theory in some detail, that of McCready 
(2015), which uses elements of both views. On McCready’s view, 
judgements of reliability are based on information coming from two 
sources: histories of interaction and initial judgements. 
Histories of interaction are, as one would expect from the name, 
records of the informational exchanges in which the speaker and hearer 
were both involved. The records contain information about what was 
communicated, the topic of communication, and whether that information 
was correct, for each action; the records themselves are constructed on the 
basis of repeated information exchange games. Taking the proportion of 
2 See e.g Coady (1992), Lackey and Sosa (2006), Lackey (2008) for some summary and discussion. 
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information exchanges in which the communicated information was 
correct yields a real number which can in turn be viewed as the probability 
of the speaker’s communicating accurate information in the next round of 
exchange. That probability can then be used to determine, for a given 
speaker, receiver, and situation, whether it is advisable to trust the speaker 
on the next exchange, or not. The theory also allows restriction to 
particular topics due to the presence of topic-related information in the 
records, a point we will return to in the next subsection. 
Plainly, this method will not suffice for all cases. In the first interaction 
between agents, there will be no history which can be used to gauge the 
reliability of the agents’ speech. At this point, decisions must be made. One 
option is the Humean one: trust the other agent in the first interaction, to 
give the benefit of the doubt. This is in fact an optimal strategy in many 
situations, as choosing not to trust initially can often lead to a pattern of 
doubt, which in turn has the capacity to destroy the interaction completely 
(cf. work on the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma by e.g. Nowak 2006). 
However, it is also extreme to simply allow trust at any given initial point: 
surely there are cases in which judging someone reliable is neither 
descriptively (empirically) or prescriptively (normatively) correct, as when 
the guy on the street corner offers to sell you the Brooklyn Bridge (for 
cheap!). The theory should allow for red flags. 
The way in which this is handled is to allow initial judgements about 
the probability that an interlocutor is reliable, based on observations of 
them and their properties, and on background assumptions. Observing 
that an individual is standing on the corner making implausible claims 
about what he’s got to sell will (likely) lead to a low initial probability of 
reliability, while the reputable accountant professionally dressed in her 
office with degrees mounted on the walls will (likely) be judged more 
reliable in the initial stage. Such judgements are Reidian, but on both the 
Reidian and Humean views later interactions are able to alter the 
judgement about reliability that is made. Still, it’s clear that in this theory, 
as in others, the various observable properties of the individual speaker 
play a very large role in determining whether that individual is to be 
trusted. This factor is very common in modern theories of testimony, but 
comes with certain moral problems, as will be detailed in the next 
subsection. 
2.2 Epistemic injustice 
What sorts of properties have an influence on judgements of testimonial 
epistemic reliability? The particulars depend on the individual theory (and 
are rarely spelled out in detail), but there are a variety of properties which 
could be relevant. For instance, in the context of a legal trial, being a 
witness could lead to heightened degrees of reliability, given that one 
swears to tell the truth, or one might take adults to be in general more 
reliable than children, or to have more epistemic authority. Such 
judgements seem relatively unpernicious, as they are founded on factors 
that may genuinely increase the probability that a piece of testimony is 
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truth-tracking: in the first case, the threat of external punishment, which 
has been shown to be effective in increasing cooperativity in game-
theoretic contexts (e.g. Gintis 2009), and personal experience in the 
second case, which is probability-increasing on the not unreasonable 
assumption that adults are better at forming judgements than children are. 
Thus, observation of relevant properties is a good strategy for making 
decisions about testimonial reliability (Fricker, 1995, McCready, 2015). 
But not all relevant properties are so benign. The kinds of properties 
that agents use in judgements of epistemic reliability are of many different 
types. Some are relevant to epistemic authority and reliability in ways that 
have clear relations to truth-tracking, as with the cases in the previous 
paragraph. In other cases, though, the kinds of properties at issue are 
deemed relevant for less justifiable reasons, or aren’t relevant at all but are 
mere bleedover from other areas of social life. A particularly problematic 
domain involves judgements about testimonial reliability stemming from 
the race or gender of the speaker. As Fricker (2007) discusses extensively 
in a philosophical context, considerations of race and gender and the 
stereotypes they come with can have a large influence on the degree of 
credence given to individual testimony. 
Within human societies, one often finds biases relating to ethnic 
groups and gender. For example, in contemporary US society, men are 
privileged over women and whites/Caucasians are privileged over other 
ethnic groups; this privilege manifests itself in various ways which prove to 
be relevant for attributions of testimonial reliability. For example, one 
often finds ethnic groups or genders associated with stereotypes relating to 
the (lack of) epistemic reliability: for instance, Asian people might be 
deemed highly reliable with respect to scientific or mathematical 
information, giving an upgrade on the credence attached to their 
testimony on such matters, or women judged to be generally emotional 
rather than logical, giving a general downgrade on their testimony. A key 
difference between these two cases should be noted, namely that, in the 
first case, the upgrade in testimony relates to a particular topic while in the 
second case the downgrade is applied across the board. A second kind of 
case involves general distrust for the whole group, leading to the ignoring 
or general devaluation of their testimony, as one often finds with the 
testimony of oppressed groups regarding their oppression. We will see this 
distinction again in the following sections. Fricker (2007) places this whole 
set of phenomena under the rubric  testimonial injustice, itself a 
subspecies of  epistemic injustice. 
This phenomenon is one which is both philosophically interesting and 
societally important; despite that, it has received little attention from an 
experimental perspective, much less a linguistic one. Our earlier work was 
aimed at filling this gap. The next section summarizes some of this earlier 
research and discusses the continuation of it that is the topic of the present 
paper. 
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3 Reliability in argumentation, Bayesian 
perspectives 
In addition to the philosophical work introduced above, the question of the 
reliability of a speaker has been addressed in argumentation studies. These 
studies seek to determine either the normative or rational principles which 
condition the quality of an argument, i.e. how convincing it is (or should) 
be to an audience (see van Eemeren et al. 2014 for a near comprehensive 
overview of argumentation studies). A large part of the concerns of 
argumentative studies is to determine what are the factors which make for 
a successful argumentation. These include for example the argument 
scheme being used by the speaker (e.g. argument from authority, or 
reductio ad absurdum) and its conditions of use (Walton et al., 2008), or 
notions of argument validity either in a strict logical framework or an 
informal logic one (Johnson and Blair, 2002, Johnson, 2006, Blair, 2011). 
In addition to these, the question of the reliability of the source of an 
argument is also considered by some. 
In most instances, it seems that, from a normative point of view, the 
reliability of the source of an argument should not play a role in its 
evaluation. Traditional approaches of argumentation consider that a good 
argument should stand on its own independently of who offered it. 
However, in many instances of real life argumentation, it is obvious that 
the identity of the source of an argument bears on its acceptability. A 
judgment coming from an expert in the field will be more trusted than 
coming from a random person, and many important societal decisions rest 
on the judgment of experts (e.g. the decision to allow a drug to be 
distributed). Briñol and Petty (2009) offer a comprehensive overview of 
the variety of factors pertaining to the source of an argument that might 
affect how an argument is processed. 
One way to account for source reliability is to classify arguments which 
hinge on the reliability of the source. This is the approach of (Walton et al., 
2008) who consider a class of arguments from source which for example 
contains the argument from authority/position to know, and the  ad 
hominem argument (which involves a direct attack on the reliability of a 
source). They then delineate the conditions under which such arguments 
are appropriate. 
Another way to approach source reliability is found in the Bayesian 
approach to argumentation fostered in (Oaksford and Hahn, 2004, Hahn 
and Oaksford, 2006). It offers a rich flexible framework in which to model 
various aspects related to argumentation, including the effects of source 
reliability. The basic tenet of that approach is that argumentation aims at 
raising the belief of an audience about a proposition. To that effect, the 
speaker asserts a constellation of arguments (or premises) aiming at 
raising that belief. In traditional Bayesian fashion, beliefs are identified 
with probabilities, and thus, a piece of evidence e  will argue in favor of a 
conclusion C  iff )(>)|( CPeCP , i.e. if and only if the belief in C  
knowing that e  is true (the posterior belief) is higher than the prior belief 
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in C . Using Bayes’ rule, one can show that the posterior belief is higher 






is higher than 1, 
i.e. iff )|(>)|( CePCeP ¬ . The likelihood ratio is thus taken as a measure
of the diagnosticity of evidence e , i.e. its ability to provide information 
about the probability of C . 
In the Bayesian approach to argumentation, the question of the 
reliability of the speaker has been investigated by Hahn et al. (2009) and 
Oaksford and Hahn (2013). The upshot of their approach is that it allows 
them to take into account the effects and interaction of a variety of factors, 
including the speaker’s reliability, the strength associated with the content 
of the argument, and the prior belief of the judge of the argument in the 
conclusion. 
Hahn et al. (2009) show how a less than perfectly reliable source of 
evidence affects the posterior belief of a judge after receiving a piece of 
evidence. The reliability is simply factored into the likelihood component 
via marginalization as in (1) (where R  stands for the speaker/source 
being reliable). 
 P(e | C) = P(e | c, R)× P(R) + P(e | c,¬R)× P(¬R)
In the case of a fully reliable speaker the reliability component can be
ignored, but whenever the source is not perfectly reliable, then equation 3 
(and its counterpart for )|( CeP ¬ ) offer a way to directly predict how the 
posterior belief will be affected by variations in speaker reliability. (Hahn 
et al., 2009) provide experimental evidence which supports the predictions 
by this model. 
Oaksford and Hahn (2013) use the same framework and approach to 
source reliability to investigate the case of ad hominem arguments, as in 
(2). 
2. A: After listening to him, I think it might be possible that Ford cars
simply drive better.
B: Actually, you should be certain that they don’t drive better.
A: Why do you think that?
B: Because how would he know? He doesn’t know the first thing
about cars.
Oaksford and Hahn (2013) show that the effectiveness of the ad 
hominem argument notably depends on the prior belief of the speaker in 
the conclusion. The stronger the belief in C , the less impact the ad 
hominem argument will have. They model this by assuming that in a 
dialog like (2), agents assume by default that the source of the argument is 
reliable. This comes as a consequence of a more general principle of 
charity which prompts hearers to make the most of whatever is uttered by 
a speaker (Wilson, 1959, Davidson, 1974), and which dovetails with the 
Humean position already mentioned. Again, the authors present 
experimental evidence which supports the predictions of the Bayesian, 
notably that pertaining to the importance of the prior belief in the 
conclusion at stake in the ad hominem attack. 
1.
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3.1 Source reliability and gender 
3.1.1 Experimental results 
In (McCready and Winterstein, 2017) we introduce experimental evidence 
which supports the idea that the gender of the source affects its perceived 
reliability. 
Two series of experiments were run among different linguistic 
communities: American English speakers based in the USA and Cantonese 
speakers based in Hong Kong. In both cases the participants were 
presented with scenarios such as (3) which instantiate an argument from 
authority, i.e. which use the source’s reliability as the reason for accepting 
a claim.3 
3. A and B are friends. A wants to buy a power drill and is thinking
about which one to buy. A wants a high performance drill to
perform heavy duty work.
A: I wonder if this one is a good choice.
B: I have a friend who says HE knows a lot about power tools, and
HE says this model is really powerful.
Participants were asked to judge how convinced they thought A was, 
given what B told him. Two conditions were manipulated in the 
experiment. 
The first factor was the gender of the referent. This was manipulated 
by changing the pronoun in small capitals in (3) to either he, she in English, 
or gendered terms for younger cousins in Cantonese.4 
We chose to manipulate gendered pronouns in order to vary gender 
judgements for two reasons, both relating to the manner in which 
information about gender is introduced by pronominals. Two major types 
of conventional content can be separated out within natural language: so-
called at-issue and not-at-issue content. At-issue content is the content of 
the main claims of the sentence in terms of truth-conditional semantics 
(see e.g. Heim and Kratzer 1998 for a basic introduction to the notion). 
Not-at-issue content is just that content which is not at issue: for example, 
it could be content which is taken for granted, as with presuppositions 
(Beaver, 1997), or irrelevant to truth completely, as with expressive 
content (Potts, 2007, McCready, 2010).5 In pronominals, gender is part of 
not-at-issue content, though it is currently a matter of debate whether it is 
presuppositional(e.g. Sudo, 2012) or expressive (e.g. McCready, 2014). 
Still, the fact that it is not at issue means that it is highly suitable for an 
experiment of this kind. 
3 The English experiment also involved instances of the ad hominem argument which we will not 
discuss here. 
4 Several native speakers confirmed that younger cousins do not hold a particular authority in 
Hong Kong society, that is, they are neither thought to be reliable like elders or looked down upon 
like younger siblings. 
5 The precise boundaries of these areas are under debate. For a recent view, see Tonhauser et al. 
(2013). 
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There are several reasons for this. The first reason involves the 
experiment itself. Making a claim about the gender of the source which is 
explicit and possibly unnatural in context makes it possible that, for some 
participants, the question of gender becomes salient and their attitudes 
toward this issue could lead to bias in their answers; thus, explicit 
introduction can be a confounder in this setting. The fact that the content 
is not at issue means that it is in some sense not open to question, or 
unchallengeable (cf. Potts, 2005); so it has a good chance of both getting 
accepted by the experimental participant in a way that is ‘under the radar,’ 
and unnoticed, avoiding the worry about confounds. Second, the 
introduction of a piece of content as not-at-issue also can help to avoid 
possible biases resulting from participant judgements about the possible 
(un)reliability of the speaker herself. 
The other factor we manipulated was the gender bias of the topic being 
discussed. This is because some topics are intuitively felt to be more 
feminine (e.g. sewing) or masculine (e.g. power tools), given existing 
social biases. 6  To assess these biases, we ran two preliminary 
categorization tasks prior to the main experiments. In those categorization 
tasks, participants had to select the gender they thought was the most 
linked to a variety of topics. The topics which were the most biased were 
selected for the main experiment. 
Among the results of the experiment we found that there was an 
interaction between the gender of the source on the convincingness of the 
argument and the topics’ biases, which we interpret as an effect of the 
gender of the source on its perceived reliability. Unlike what could have 
been expected, the results do not show a symmetric pattern where 
masculine sources are trusted for masculine topics and vice-versa for 
feminine sources. Rather, we observed that masculine sources seemed to 
be trusted in roughly the same manner for all topics, whereas female 
sources were distrusted for masculine topics. 
3.1.2 Modeling 
 The experimental results presented above show that when additional 
evidence about the source of authority is available, participants seemed to 
discard the principle of charity, i.e. the default assumption of reliability of 
the source. More precisely, the results suggest that participants kept being 
charitable with male sources, but modified their impression of reliability 
with female sources depending on the topic being discussed. 
In Fig. 1 we use a Bayesian Belief Network representation (Pearl, 
2009) to show the causal links between the different factors involved when 
evaluating the presentation of a piece of evidence by a source in order to 
target a conclusion. This representation is a refined version of that 
proposed by (Hahn et al., 2009) who do not consider factors that might 
affect reliability. We consider the following variables:   
6 Hereafter we will use the terms masculine topic and feminine topic for these categories; this 
terminology should not be taken as an endorsement, but as shorthand for ‘topics socially 
categorized as masculine/feminine.’ 
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 HYP is the hypothesis being discussed, i.e. the goal or conclusion of
the argument.
 EVI is the piece of evidence being presented by the source of
information.
 REL is the (perceived) reliability of the source of information.
 FTR are the observable features of the source such as its gender,
grooming, occupation etc.
 TOP is the general topic being discussed. This variable is also
observed when dealing with a particular example of argumentation,
i.e. its value is known to the participants.
Figure 1: Causal model for evidence reports with factors affecting the 
source’s reliability. Observed variables are greyed out. 
The directed arrows indicate a causal link between variables. Thus, the 
truth of an hypothesis (e.g. having contracted a disease) will affect the 
probability of generating a given piece of evidence about it (e.g. showing a 
given symptom) rather than the other way around. Similarly, we assume 
that the perceived reliability of the source is affected by its features and by 
the topic being discussed, e.g. some topics are supposed to be known by all 
or very few etc. Note that the joint probability distribution represented in 
that network corresponds to the beliefs of the judge, i.e. the causal links 
represent how they think variables affect each other. 
Observe that in Fig. 1, the variable REL d-separates the variables TOP 
and FTR from the evidence report EVI. This means that the evidence report 
is independent of the topic and features of the source conditional on the 
relevance: )|},{( RelFtrTopEvi ⊥⊥  (Pearl, 2009). Therefore, our proposal 
is indeed a supplement to the view of reliability proposed by Hahn and 
colleagues. If a speaker is charitably assumed to be reliable, i.e. once REL is 
fixed, then FTR and TOP have no influence anymore. The framework thus 
offers the necessary flexibility to account for our data: it takes into account 
the effect of the variations of the speaker’s reliability, but also factors 
which affect that perceived reliability. 
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To evaluate the cogency of a piece of evidence e  for a conclusion H , 
we consider the probability ),,|( ii tgeHP , with it  the topic being 
discussed and ig  the observed gender of the source. The way this 









. To integrate the reliability of the source 
along with the other factors in Fig.1, we can rewrite likelihoods as in (4). 
4. ),|(),,,|(),|(),,,|(=),,|( iiiiiiiiii tgRPtgRHePtgRPtgRHePtgHeP ¬¬+
3.1.3 Open issues 
The formalization introduced above provides a way to account for some of 
the experimental results we mentioned. However, there are still some 
loose ends to fully validate the model. 
One issue concerns the question of the categorization of topics as 
masculine and feminine ones. The categorization tasks we used in our 
initial experiments were rather coarse: a given topic was set firmly in a 
gender category, and there was no finer measurement of the affinity of a 
gender with each topic. This was a simplification: rather than dealing in 
such absolute terms, it is more appropriate to think about the relation 
between topics and gender as a probabilistic one, i.e. by asking questions 
such as “given that the source of information is male, how probable is it 
that he knows about topic X”, or “given that we’re talking about X, how 
likely is it that a knowledgeable person about X is male/female?”. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that men are judged reliable overall, 
even for feminine topics. We evoked the possibility that this was due to a 
charity assumption, but it could also be the case that the strength of the 
association between gender and topics was weaker in the feminine case. 
This is something which the categorization task cannot reflect since 
participants were forced to select a unique category for each topic rather 
than giving nuanced judgments. Concretely, we need a way to evaluate the 
quantity ),|( ii tgRP  that appears in 1 in a more subtle way which would be 
a better representation of the probabilistic relationship we assume 
between source reliability, source gender and topic. This will be the topic 
of Section 4. 
Another issue has to do with the fact that in 3.1.1, the source of the 
information is claimed to be knowledgeable about the topic being 
discussed. We assumed that being knowledgeable about a topic entails 
being a reliable source about it, but this is disputable. We leave that debate 
for further work. 
4 A finer bias categorization 
 In this section we present the results of an experiment which aimed at a 
better understanding and categorization of the explicit gender biases of the 
topics used in our experiments. 
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We make the hypothesis that the strength of the causal links between 
the variables in Fig.1 can be measured, and then used to fit empirical data. 
Specifically, for a given topic we can obtain an evaluation of the 
proportions of men and women which are deemed to be knowledgeable, 
and thus reliable, about this particular topic. Formally, this means that for 
a topic it  and gender ig , we have access to ),|( ii gtRP : the probability 
that a source of information is reliable knowing that we’re dealing with 
topic it  and the source is of gender ig . Assuming the simplified 
hypothesis that we are restricted to two genders, measuring the proportion 
of people of each gender which is knowledgeable about a topic gives us 
access to the joint probability distribution regulating how reliability is 
affected by gender and topic. 
Beyond this, the experimental results will also be used to compare 
gender biases about comparable topics between different linguistic 
communities: English speakers from the USA and Japanese speakers from 
Japan.7 
4.1 Materials and Method 
Two experiments were run, with a similar structure and methodology, one 
in Japanese and one in (American) English. 28 voluntary native Japanese 
speakers participants from Japan (10 female, 18 male) were recruited by 
snowball sampling for the Japanese experiment. 48 native English 
speakers participants from USA (23 female, 24 male, 1 other) were 
recruited through the Prolific Academic platform, and paid the equivalent 
of one British pound for their participation. 
The experiment consisted in two on-line questionnaires (one per 
language, both hosted on the IbexFarm platform). After indicating their 
consent and their gender, participants were presented with 39 topics for 
which they had to indicate the proportion of women and that of men who 
they thought is knowledgeable about that particular topic. Figure 2 shows 
one item from the English experiment. 
Figure 2: Screen capture of one item in the English categorization 
task 
7 A Cantonese experiment is underway, but results are not available yet. 
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The 39 topics were chosen using several intuitive criteria. On one hand 
we stuck to topics with low stakes for the participants in the conversation. 
A topic that might have life and death consequences (such as the use of a 
drug or the safety of a car) were left out because such implications are 
bound to affect judgments of arguments which involve them (typically, the 
acceptability threshold of the arguments are set much higher). Second, we 
tried to pick a balanced set of topics in terms of gender biases, i.e. we 
selected an equal number of topics which we intuitively felt would be 
judged to be more masculine, feminine or neutral (i.e. known by an equal 
proportion of men and women). Another point of attention in the selection 
of the topics was that they had to be relevant to both American and 
Japanese participants (e.g. baseball coaching), or be of comparable 
importance (e.g. Disney and Sanrio characters). Finally, the 18 topics used 
in the experiments discussed by (McCready and Winterstein, 2017) were 
nearly all part of the materials here with the exception of three of them 
which either involved high stakes or did not translate well in Japanese. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Observation of the data 
On Figure 3 we plot the average scores for the proportion of men and 
women who were judged to be knowledgeable about each topic. Each dot is 
colored according to the author’s prior intuition about the topic’s bias 
( BPrior = neutral prior, FPrior = feminine prior and MPrior =
masculine prior). 
Figure 3: Categorization: main results and comparison with authors’ 
intuitions 
A visual inspection of the data shows that, overall, the results fit with 
the authors’ predicted bias of each topic, especially for the USA data. 
Neutral topics (in red) are along the diagonal of the plot. The blue 
masculine topics occupy the upper part of the quadrant, corresponding to 
a higher proportion of men who were thought to be knowledgeable about 
the topic, and vice-versa for the green feminine ones. 
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The observation of the results also shows that the feminine and 
masculine clouds of topics have different shapes, both within and between 
the two experiments. Generally, the masculine clouds appear more 
compact, whereas the feminine topics are more spread out, suggesting a 
higher variability. Another difference seems to be that the Japanese results 
are more skewed toward the bottom left corner of the graph, meaning that 
overall participants were more reluctant to attribute knowledge to people 
in general. We are unsure of the reason for this difference; one explanation 
is that it has to do with the particular way the questions were posed in 
Japanese, or that it has to do with the semantics of knowledge attributions 
in that language. This issue merits further investigation. 
4.2.2 Clustering of the data 
To better assess the way topics form coherent sets, we used unsupervised 
clustering techniques on the averaged data sets. The Hopkins statistic 
(Japan: 0.22 , USA: 0.44 ) and visual assessment of cluster tendency 
suggest that there is a moderate tendency of the data to aggregate in 
clusters. To determine the number of clusters we used elbowing by 
examining the plot of within groups sums of squares by number of clusters. 
In combination with the expectation that the number of clusters should be 
between 3 (one cluster per main gender bias) to 6 (adding one subdivision 
within each group), the optimal number of clusters for USA was 
determined to be 6 and 5 for Japan. We then used K-means clustering 
(MacQueen, 1967) and hierarchical clustering on both data sets. The 
clusters were mostly stable across methods. Figure 4 shows the results of 
the hierarchical clustering. 
Figure 4: Hierarchical Clustering on the USA and Japan 
categorization results 
The clusters suggest similar conclusions as those above: for each 
linguistic community the feminine topics are spread out and divided in 
two clusters. Roughly, one cluster contains topics known by most women 
and some women (sunscreen, Sanrio ( = Disney for USA) etc.) and another 
known by some women but few men (sewing, breast pumps) 
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This bi-partition is not reflected in the masculine topics. For each 
linguistic community, one clear cluster of masculine topics stands out, 
with another cluster mixing neutral topics (USA/Japan: Thai food) and 
somewhat masculine oriented topics (USA: antique cars/Japan: baseball). 
The shape of this cluster is the only that changes significantly depending 
on the clustering method being used. 
4.2.3 Fitting with previous data 
 In addition to the grouping of the topics in clusters, we also evaluated the 
effect of the measured quantities on the convincingness scores measured 
in the experiment reported by (McCready and Winterstein, 2017). In that 
experiment, participants indicated how convincing they found an 
argument based on a claim of being knowledgeable about the topic at hand. 
Originally, we considered a ternary predictor for convincingness which 
corresponded to the topic bias (masc./fem./neutral). Here we use instead 
the values measured in the experiment presented above. Specifically, we 
consider three independent factors as predictors of the values of 
convincingness:   
 Gender: the gender g  of the source of information
 Reliability: the average proportion of individuals of gender g
deemed to be knowledgeable about the topic being discussed
(measured on a scale of 1 to 5, obtained in the presently reported
experiment).
 Opp.Reliability: the average proportion of individuals of gender
g¬  deemed to be knowledgeable about the topic being discussed
(measured like Reliability).8
 There were thus two data points per topic: one for masculine sources, 
one for feminine sources, for a total of 28 data points (only the topics 
present in the convincingness experiments could be used out of the 39 
involved in the present study). 
We fitted linear mixed models to the data with optimized random 
structures, using model comparison via likelihood ratio tests to assess the 
significance of the factors and their interactions. 
Given the paucity of the data, we found few significant effects. The 
variable Opp.Reliability does not seem to have any effect, even nearly 
significant, meaning that participants did not consider the association of 
the topic with the opposite gender of that of the source when evaluating 
arguments. However, we observed a marginally significant interaction 
between Gender and Reliability ( 0.08=3.05,=2 pχ ). More specifically it 
appears that for female sources, there is a positive correlation between 
Reliability and the convincingness of the argument: the more women were 
judged to be competent on a topic, the more the argument was judged 
persuasive. 
8 Again this assumes the oversimplifying hypothesis that there are only two mutually exclusive 
genders. 
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4.3 Discussion 
The results of the refined categorization experiment also confirm that 
there is a gender asymmetry afoot when dealing with arguments from 
authority. 
A first remark is that the strength with which topics are associated 
with a gender does not seem to differ between masculine and feminine 
topics. Therefore, the results discussed by (McCready and Winterstein, 
2017) cannot be explained by treating them as artifacts of a difference of 
that order. This strengthens the hypothesis that the differences are rather 
due to the gender of the source. 
While the biases do not differ in strength, they do however differ in the 
way they are spread. This asymmetry of the topics’ gender biases can be 
accounted for in at least two ways. On one hand, it can simply come from a 
badly balanced choice of topics to begin with, i.e. it could well be that with 
a choice of different masculine topics a bi-partition comparable to the one 
observed for feminine topics would be found. On the other hand, it could 
also reflect a genuine difference in how topics are gender biased. This 
would mean that masculine topics are more homogeneously identified as 
masculine and known by men in general, whereas feminine topics would 
not necessarily entail that a feminine source is knowledgeable about them 
(but rather suggest that if a person is knowledgeable about them, that 
person is most likely female). 
Beyond that observation, we also found that, on our limited data set, 
the use of refined scores of reliability rather than simple categorical 
variables tends to support our initial conclusions. The scores we collected 
are supposed to reflect the proportion of women/men who are 
knowledgeable about a given topic. As such they represent ),|( ii tgRP  the 
probability of the source being reliable knowing that the source is of 
gender ig  and we are dealing with topic it . The analysis of the results 
shows that this quantity only seems to be taken into account with female 
sources when evaluating the convincingness of the argument. 
We already mentioned that one way to account for this is to assume 
that when the source is masculine the charity principle applies, whereas it 
does not for a feminine source. This can be slightly refined. The test items 
of the convincingness experiment involved a claim of competence by the 
source itself. If that claim is accepted by the participant, then the question 
of the reliability is settled and its gender and the fit of the gender with the 
topic have no influence anymore. The differences between masculine and 
feminine sources can thus be interpreted as differences in how ready we 
are to believe a source who claims to be competent. Being charitable then 
means accepting a claim of competence, even about a topic for which prior 
knowledge tells us that the gender of the source does not make it likely the 
source is knowledgeable. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper has discussed certain sources of bias in attributions of 
epistemic authority and reliability, and presented experimental results 
designed to investigate these biases and their robustness across cultural 
contexts. The results open various avenues for future research. 
From the experimental point of view, we plan on running more 
complete experiments with more statistical power, that cover all topics, in 
the three languages that we are considering (Japanese, Hong Kong 
Cantonese, English). Hopefully, this should strengthen our hypothesis that 
different strategies are at play when evaluating arguments coming from 
differently gendered sources. 
Another direction for future work is to consider topics for which 
implicit biases are known (Greenwald et al., 2009). In this work, we 
measured explicit biases. While this allows us to get a fine grained 
characterization of the biases by gender, those results are not perfect 
images of the actual implicit biases which most likely influence 
participants’ judgments. Our results do suggest that, in addition to our 
explicit biases, participants might apply different heuristics regarding 
charity according to the gender of the source; so a more thorough 
investigation of implicit biases appears warranted. 
Finally, we will also investigates other source biases. Gender is but one 
feature that enters into consideration when interpreting an argument. 
Other elements include other observable features of the source such as 
their ethnic group, but also features of the interpreter. Most important 
among these is the alignment of the features of the interpreter with those 
of the source. Previous work has shown that such group membership 
alignment can improve the persuasiveness of an argument (Fleming and 
Petty, 2000). Yet, our preliminary results show that masculine judges 
might be more distrustful of masculine sources for masculine topics. We 
will thus closely examine this data, and propose a refined version of the 
strategies at play in the evaluation of source reliability. 
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